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INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, the Superior Court of New Jersey made a bold
move in an attempt to combat the harms presented by texting while
driving.1 Kubert v. Best articulated a duty to refrain from sending
messages to someone who is driving if the texter knows, or has “spe-
cial reason to know,” that the recipient will view the text message
while driving.2
In an age of constant communication and instant gratification,
drivers increasingly choose to send and read text messages while
driving instead of waiting until a safer time.3 Texting while driving
is undoubtedly a dangerous combination of activities,4 and is now a
serious problem in the United States.5 In addition to public outcry,
state legislatures have responded strongly to the problem—a re-
sponse reminiscent of the drunk driving epidemic in the 1980s.6 
The court’s decision in Kubert v. Best is, therefore, in keeping with
the trend of increasing penalties for texting while driving.7 How-
ever, the new duty of care articulated in Kubert expands liability for
third parties.
Although texting while driving is an increasingly important topic
in the discussion of our nation’s safety on the roads and has evoked
a visible legislative response,8 little has been done to examine civil
liability in the context of text messaging and driving. Various
scholarly articles have addressed the texting while driving epidemic
and the legislative response.9 However, few, if any, scholarly works
1. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
2. Id. at 1228.
3. In a national survey, researchers found that 18 percent of all drivers and 49 percent
of drivers ages 21 to 24 reported texting while driving. JULIE TISON ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NATIONAL PHONE SURVEY ON DISTRACTED DRIVING ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORS 21 (2011), available at http://perma.cc/L4A2-6CCV.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See infra Part I.B-C.
6. See infra Part IV.A.1.
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. See, e.g., A. Starkey De Soto, Note, Intexication: Txting Whl Drvng: Does the
Punishment Fit the Crime?, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 359 (2010) (discussing the legislative response
to texting while driving and proposing different, and possibly more effective, solutions); Cody
J. Harding, Note, The Failure of State Texting-While-Driving Laws, U. PITT. J. TECH. L. &
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address the civil liability of remote third-party texters. This is in
part because few cases involving texting while driving have reached
appellate courts. This Note fills that gap by analyzing remote third-
party texter liability.
This Note will examine the potential civil liability of third-party
texters against the backdrop of existing tort liability and through
the lens of history and policy. This Note argues that liability should
not be placed on the remote third-party texter. Doing so would
extend third-party liability well beyond any articulated and es-
tablished duty, and would depart from our current understanding
of third-party liability. Ultimately, this Note concludes that because
this duty expands liability and because it is difficult to prove, other
states should not follow New Jersey’s lead in creating this basis for
civil liability.
Part I discusses the background in which this situation arises by
analyzing the United States’ texting while driving problem and the
legislative response to it. Part II analyzes traditional civil liability
imposed on third parties and explains how the new duty would play
out in analogous situations. Part III considers the difficulties of
proving this new duty. Part IV addresses counterarguments in favor
of assigning liability to remote third-party texters.
I. SETTING THE SCENE
A. Kubert v. Best
In 2009, husband and wife David and Linda Kubert were “griev-
ously injured” when a pick-up truck driven by eighteen-year-old
Kyle Best hit the motorcycle they were riding.10 Best’s vehicle
crossed the center line into the Kuberts’ lane, and the front of his
vehicle struck the Kuberts and their motorcycle.11 The Kuberts
were seriously injured—both lost their left legs as a result of the
POL’Y 1 (2013) (analyzing the success of criminal texting while driving statutes); Thomas E.
Sherzan, Note, “Talk 2 U L8R”—Why Cell Phones and Driving Have “G2G”: An Analysis of
the Dangers of Cell Phone Use While Driving, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 217 (2010) (discussing the
harms of cell phone use while driving and potential solutions to these problems).
10. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
11. Id.
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accident.12 Telephone records revealed that right before the
accident, Best and his friend, Shannon Colonna, exchanged text
messages while Best was driving his vehicle home from work.13
When the accident occurred, New Jersey had already passed a law
prohibiting texting while driving except in specific emergency
situations.14
In addition to suing Best for his negligence,15 the Kuberts also
sued Colonna, claiming that she had an “independent duty to avoid
texting to a person who was driving a motor vehicle” because her
“electronic[ ] presen[ce]” in the vehicle as a result of her text
message conversation with Best constituted “aiding and abetting”
Best’s illegal cell phone use while driving.16 The court articulated
the new duty of care in the appeal of entry of summary judgment for
Colonna.17 It decreed that “a person sending text messages has a
duty not to text someone who is driving if the texter knows, or has
special reason to know, the recipient will view the text while
driving.”18 However, the court went on to say that in this particular
case, the “plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence to prove
that Colonna had such knowledge when she texted Best immedi-
ately before the accident.”19 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
grant of summary judgment in Colonna’s favor.20
The majority did not hold Colonna liable because “the evidence ...
[was] not sufficient to conclude that Colonna took affirmative steps
and gave substantial assistance to Best in violating the law.”21
However, although the court acknowledged that “[i]t is the primary
responsibility of the driver to obey the law and to avoid distrac-
tions,” they nonetheless imposed a duty on the sender of a text
message to refrain from texting someone who is driving in certain
circumstances.22
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1220-21. 
14. Id. at 1218.
15. The Kuberts eventually settled their claims against Best. Id. at 1218.
16. Id. at 1221, 1224-25.
17. Id. at 1219.
18. Id. at 1221.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1229.
21. Id. at 1225.
22. Id. at 1227.
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B. The Texting While Driving Epidemic in the United States
Text messaging has quickly become a very common method of
communication in the United States. As of June 2010, over 173
billion text messages were sent per month compared to only 12.2
million per month in June 2000.23 Although texting is certainly a
useful form of communication, research shows that sending a text
message while driving requires the driver to take her eyes off the
road for approximately 4.6 seconds.24 This equates to driving at fifty-
five miles per hour for the length of a football field without looking
at the road.25
A form of “distracted driving,” texting while driving and its
dangers have been studied extensively, both through research sim-
ulations and analyses of historical data. Researchers have found
that drivers who text are twenty-three times more likely to be
involved in a safety-critical event than if they refrained from text-
ing.26 Furthermore, based on their analysis of historical data on
road fatalities, cell phone subscriber rates, and estimated text
message volumes, researchers Fernando Wilson and Jim Stimson
concluded that “recent and rapid increases in texting volumes have
resulted in thousands of additional road fatalities yearly in the
United States.”27
C. Legislative Response
 Legislatures have recognized the dangers of texting and driving
and have taken steps to discourage the practice. Forty-four states,
23. CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, WIRELESS IN AMERICA 4 (2011), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/
WirelessInAmerica_Jan2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/AH6A-DQ46] (providing a history of wireless
use in the United States and information about how wireless service works).
24. REBECCA L. OLSON ET AL., FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., DRIVER DISTRACTION IN COMMERCIAL VEHICLE OPERATIONS 143 (2009), available at
http://perma.cc/35XJ-3ULH (investigating the impact of driver distraction in commercial
motor vehicle operations).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 146.
27. Fernando A. Wilson & Jim P. Stimpson, Trends in Fatalities From Distracted Driving
in the United States, 1999 to 2008, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2213, 2218 (2010) (analyzing
historical data to identify trends in highway fatalities and the connection to increased cell
phone use by drivers).
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the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands currently prohibit all drivers from text messaging.28 Other
states have enacted less comprehensive bans. For example, some
states prohibit texting while driving for novice drivers or public
transit drivers.29
The New Jersey law is a typical example of banning texting and
driving. It states that “the use of a wireless telephone or electronic
communication device by an operator of a moving motor vehicle on
a public road or highway shall be unlawful except when the tele-
phone is a hands-free wireless telephone or the electronic communi-
cation device is used hands-free.”30 Violation of this statute is a
primary offense in New Jersey and carries a fine of $100.31
Following the Kuberts’ accident and other traffic accidents
involving texting while driving, New Jersey enacted additional
legislation to address the dangers presented by texting while
driving. The new law, named “Kulesh’s, Kuberts’ & Bolis’ Law,”
amends the vehicular homicide statute to allow an inference of
reckless driving if the defendant was using a cell phone in violation
of the ban on texting while driving.32 This law also provides criminal
penalties for drivers who injure others while texting and driving.33
In addition to its inclusion in the vehicular homicide statute, this
inference was also added to New Jersey’s “assault by auto” statute,
which addresses situations in which a person drives a vehicle
recklessly and causes bodily injury to another.34
The key element in both the vehicular homicide and assault by
auto statutes is the reckless driving of a vehicle.35 With this amend-
ment, the prosecution in a case of death by vehicular homicide or
assault by auto can rely on the impermissible cell phone use to infer
that the defendant was driving recklessly.36 Although such an infer-
ence is not binding on the jury, the jury may rely on the inference
28. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DIGEST OF
DISTRACTED DRIVING LAWS, at v-ix (2013), available at http://perma.cc/8PA8-4SXN.
29. Id.
30. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3 (West 2010).
31. Id.
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5(a) (West 2012).
33. Id.
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(c)(1) (West 2012).
35. Id.; § 2C:11-5(a).
36. §§ 2C:11-5(a); 2C:12-1(c)(1).
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alone to find that the defendant was driving recklessly.37 Thus,
these amendments make it easier for the state to obtain convictions
in cases of vehicular homicide and assault by auto where the
defendant was texting while driving in violation of the statutory
ban.
Although the legislative response has surely helped deter texting
while driving, the legislature’s decisions are not without criticism.38
One principal problem with bans on texting while driving lies in
their enforcement.39 Enforcing laws that prohibit texting while driv-
ing by a class of drivers, such as novice drivers, is often unworkable
for police officers as it is difficult to determine the age of a driver
from a distance.40 Additionally, statutes that allow for only second-
ary enforcement further hinder effective execution of texting bans.41
Beyond enforcement, the divide between driver perceptions of the
dangers of texting while driving and their actions presents addi-
tional difficulties.42
These issues have resulted in lax enforcement of texting and
driving laws. For example, from 2010 through 2012, only 1,281
drivers were convicted of violating Georgia’s ban on texting and
driving.43 Compared to the 22,500 convictions for driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs during the same time frame,44 this
number seems miniscule.
Given the high rates of texting while driving and the potential
harms to the safety of those on America’s roadways, it should come
as no surprise that texting while driving is considered a deadly
37. CRIMINAL MODEL CHARGES—VEHICULAR HOMICIDE, NEW JERSEY COURTS (2004),
available at http://perma.cc/NP73-ACJQ (instructing the jury that “it is within your power to
find that proof of recklessness has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences
that may arise from the nature of the acts and circumstances surrounding the conduct in
question”).
38. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
39. See Sherzan, supra note 9, at 253-55.
40. Id. at 253.
41. See Harding, supra note 9, at 9.
42. In a recent survey conducted by AT&T, 97 percent of teens surveyed said that they
believed texting while driving was dangerous, but 43 percent of the teens surveyed still
admitted to doing it. AT&T Teen Driver Survey Executive Summary, AT&T, (May 2012),
http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/txting_driving/att_teen_survey_executive.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XX8N-AM9P].
43. See Harding, supra note 9, at 13.
44. See id.
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national epidemic.45 In fact, during a Senate hearing in 2009, Julius
Genachowski, the Chairman of the Federal Communication Com-
mission, called texting and driving “the most pressing vital [safety]
issue” on our highways.46 
II. THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTIES
Imposing civil liability for remote third-party texters, as the court
did in Kubert, involves a unique confluence of factors that have not
been combined previously. First, the third-party texter is not in the
vehicle with the driver; rather, he or she texts from another
location. Second, reading a text message is a voluntary activity, and
the connection between sending and reading a text message is
attenuated, as the third-party texter may not foresee the recipient
reading the text message while driving. Taken together, these
factors create a duty to the public that exceeds previous duties of
third parties. Of course, it is important to remember that a duty
alone does not impose civil liability for negligence.47 One must show
not only that a duty existed, but also that it was breached, and that
the breach caused the damages.48 
A. Common Tort Duties
Civil liability for a remote third-party sender of a text message
had not been explored before Kubert. More commonly explored bases
for civil liability arising from cell phone use involve the liability of
the driver, the telephone company supplying the wireless service,
and the employer of an individual who uses his cell phone while
driving in his capacity as employee.49 Courts have clearly estab-
lished the direct civil liability of the driver using a cell phone while
45. See Driven to Distraction: Technological Devices and Vehicle Safety: J. Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. & the Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech.
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 45 (2009).
46. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
48. Id.
49. See generally, Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Civil Liability Arising from Use of Cell Phone
While Driving, 36 A.L.R. 6th 443 (2008). 
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driving.50 At the other end of the spectrum, actions against cell
phone service providers based on providing cell phones to drivers
who may choose to use them while driving have failed because no
relationship exists between the provider and the driver that would
create a duty of care.51 A remote third party, like Shannon Colonna
in the Kubert case, clearly falls in between these two extremes—she
has more of a relationship with the driver than a cell phone service
provider, but she is not the driver herself.
Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a
traditional understanding of harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another. The applicable section to this
argument is section 876(b), which states that “[f]or harm resulting
to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he ... knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement
to the other so to conduct himself.”52
The court cited this provision as the basis for creating a duty of
care between remote third-party texters and the public in Kubert.53
In that case, the court framed Colonna’s conduct as aiding and
abetting Best’s negligent driving by using a cell phone.54 Although
the court did not find Colonna liable under this section, it did not
preclude liability for other third-party texters if they had the
requisite knowledge, took affirmative steps, and gave substantial
assistance to the negligent actor.55 Such affirmative steps might
include actively encouraging the driver to read and respond to the
text message while driving.56 The Kubert court left open the
possibility that third-party texters could be liable under this section
50. See, e.g., McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 870 So. 2d 547 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
the defendant solely at fault for a parking lot accident because she was talking on her cell
phone and not looking at the road at the time of the accident). 
51. See, e.g., Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The
court in Williams held that the cell phone service provider owes no duty of care to third party
injured by driver using a phone because there is no relationship between the carrier and the
driver and because “[a] cellular phone does not cause a driver to wreck a car. Rather, it is the
driver’s inattention while using the phone that may cause an accident.” Id.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
53. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1223-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
54. Id. at 1224-25.
55. Id. at 1225.
56. Id.
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if the plaintiffs could prove that the remote texter was aiding and
abetting the driver by providing active encouragement or substan-
tial assistance.57
B. Analogies to Similar Situations
Although the situation in Kubert itself is unique, it shares
similarities to other tort cases in which courts have traditionally
imposed civil liability. For example, there are a number of parallels
between the situations of a remote third-party texter and a passen-
ger in the vehicle who is distracting the driver. 
1. The Passenger’s Duty Not to Distract the Driver
A passenger in a vehicle has a duty not to interfere with the
driver’s operation of the vehicle.58 A passenger who breaches this
duty and causes such interference may be civilly liable.59 The scope
of this duty must be reasonable and is considered under a “totality
of the circumstances” approach.60 A passenger might be liable under
this theory if he shouts or yells at the driver or if he “obstruct[s] the
driver’s view of the road, for example, by suddenly holding a piece
of paper in front of the driver’s face and urging the driver to look at
what is written or depicted on the paper.”61 This duty of the
passenger, however, is not all encompassing. For instance, it does
not require the passenger to warn the driver about impending dan-
ger, supervise the driver’s driving, or keep a lookout for danger.62
The court in Sanke v. Bechina invoked this duty of a passenger
not to interfere with the driver.63 In this Illinois case, the court
57. Id. 
58. See Lombardo v. Hoag, 634 A.2d 550, 559 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
59. See, e.g., Olson v. Ische, 343 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Minn. 1984) (“A passenger who
interferes with his driver’s operation of the motor vehicle, for instance by grabbing the
steering wheel, may be liable to others, and a passenger who is the owner of the car may be
liable, at common law, for negligent entrustment to an incompetent driver.”).
60. See Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008).
61. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227.
62. See Dunfee, 939 A.2d at 828 (citing Tabor v. O’Grady, 157 A.2d 701, 705 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1960)).
63. 576 N.E.2d 1212, 1213 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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found that the passenger breached his duty by encouraging the dri-
ver to exceed the speed limit and ignore a stop sign.64 The parties in
this case were allegedly involved in a vehicular competition at the
time of the crash.65 The court held that this conduct fell squarely
within the parameters of section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.66 
These situations differ from the facts in Kubert because the
remote third-party texter is not present in the vehicle at the time of
the accident. Furthermore, the connection between reckless driving
and the choice to open and read a text message, and possibly to
respond, is much more attenuated than the connection between a
passenger distracting the driver by yelling or obscuring the line of
vision. 
A person’s decision to open and read a text message is distinct
from their physiological reaction to a stimulus presented to them.
A driver has no choice but to hear the words yelled at him by a
passenger or to see the object put in his line of vision by a passen-
ger. His reaction to that stimulus represents more of an unavoidable
physiological response than a voluntary undertaking.
On the other hand, opening and reading a text message is
voluntary. The driver must choose to open the text message and
read it. He is in no way forced to react to the receipt of the message.
In fact, he has the option to simply ignore the message until a safer
time presents itself. With the “silent” feature on most cell phones,
the driver may not even know he has a text message until he takes
the initiative to check his phone, which is also a voluntary choice. 
The additional voluntary steps inherent in the reading of a text
message set the remote third-party texter scenario apart from the
more traditional driver-distraction causes. The driver has to choose
to be distracted by a text message, whereas other distractions are
not within the control of the driver.
64. Id. at 1213, 1218-19.
65. Id. at 1215.
66. Id. at 1218-19 (noting, however, that “[a]s the Restatement points out, the
participation or assistance may be so slight that liability will not be imposed,” thus the case
was remanded for determination of whether the conduct constituted substantial assistance).
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2. Social Host Liability
The situation in Kubert also bears some similarities to social host
liability because neither the social host nor the third-party texter is
present at the time of the incident. Social host liability imposes a
duty on hosts serving alcohol to avoid creating a foreseeable risk of
harm to their guests or others due to drunken behavior.67 Should
they breach this duty, the social host can be found civilly liable for
harm caused by guests to third parties—so long as the furnishing of
alcohol is the proximate cause of injury.68 Similar to the liability of
a remote third-party texter, social host liability implicates a person
not present at the place and time of the event giving rise to the
cause of action.
Another case from New Jersey, Kelly v. Gwinnell, was the seminal
case in extending social host liability to cover third parties based on
common law negligence principles.69 In that case, the party injured
in a drunk driving accident brought a civil action against the social
host who provided the alcohol to the driver.70 The court held: 
[W]here a host provides liquor directly to a social guest and
continues to do so even beyond the point at which the host
knows the guest is intoxicated, and does this knowing that the
guest will shortly thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, that
host is liable for the foreseeable consequences to third parties
that result from the guest’s drunken driving.71
67. Denise Jones Lord, Comment, Beyond Social Host Liability: Accomplice Liability, 19
CUMB. L. REV. 553, 564-65 (1989) (discussing common law negligence actions based on social
host liability, as well as theories of social host liability based on Dram Shop statutes and
negligence per se).
68. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1214, 1230 (N.J. 1984).
69. See id.; see also Jacob R. Pritcher, Jr., Note, Is it Time to Turn Out the Lights? Social
Host Liability Extended to Third Persons Injured by Intoxicated Adult Guests: Beard v. Graff,
801 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ granted) (en banc), 22 TEX. TECH L. REV.
903, 905-06, 918 (1991) (“[A] social host may incur civil liability if the plaintiff proves that the
host had exclusive control over the alcohol supply, the host served the guest an alcoholic
beverage knowing that the guest was intoxicated, and that the host knew when the drink was
served that the guest would be driving while intoxicated.”).
70. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1230.
71. Id.
2015] CIVIL LIABILITY OF REMOTE THIRD-PARTY TEXTERS 1015
Social host liability for third parties is similar to liability for
remote third-party texters because both the social host and the
texter are not present at the time and place of the scene of the
accident—both are remote. However, there is a significant difference
between these two situations as well. This difference hinges on
foreseeability. 
The consumption of alcohol creates a physiological, scientifically
quantifiable response. Alcohol depresses the body’s central nervous
system and affects the mood, mental ability, and physical ability of
the consumer.72 The consumption of alcohol can slow and impair
both judgment and motor coordination.73 These effects often impair
the consumer’s ability to safely drive a motor vehicle.
In contrast, receipt of a text message causes no such physiologi-
cal, bodily responses. The driver may become aware that he has
received a message, but that does not in and of itself affect his
ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. Rather, as discussed above,
the driver must affirmatively choose to take his attention off the
road when opening and reading the message while he is driving.74
Therefore, it is foreseeable that a driver who has been drinking
will have an impaired ability to operate his vehicle safely. However,
it is not as foreseeable that a person who receives a text message
while driving will open it. In fact, it is possible that the intended
recipient will not receive the text message due to faulty wireless
servers or the recipient having his cell phone turned off, among
other reasons.75 The cause of the accident by a driver who is reading
a text message is his inattention, not the text message itself,76 and
the connection between the inattention and the text message is
attenuated. This is in stark contrast to the social host situation, in
which the cause of the accident is a reaction to the consumption of
72. What Is Intoxication?, UNIV. NOTRE DAME MCDONALD CTR. FOR STUDENT WELL-BEING,
http://oade.nd.edu/educate-yourself-alcohol/what-is-intoxication/ [http://perma.
cc/VWP9-KN2E] (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
73. Acute Intoxication, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/
terminology/acute_intox/en/ [http://perma.cc/H64J-MGNU] (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (“Al-
cohol intoxication is manifested by such signs as facial flushing, slurred speech, unsteady gait,
euphoria, increased activity, volubility, disorderly conduct, slowed reactions, impaired judg-
ment and motor incoordination, insensibility, or stupefaction.”).
74. See supra Part II.B.1.
75. See discussion infra Part III.A.
76. See Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
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alcohol provided by the social host, and the connection between the
intoxication and the accident is clear and undeniable.
3. Products Liability and Distracted Driving
Perhaps the most factually analogous situation to Kubert is that
of the liability of third-party companies, such as cell phone manufac-
turers and service providers, for harm caused by the use of their
products. Although these cases have been argued under theories of
products liability, they are factually similar to the situation of the
third-party texter. 
In an Indiana case, Williams v. Cingular Wireless, a motorist,
using a cell phone furnished by Cingular, struck Williams’s ve-
hicle.77 Williams alleged that Cingular was negligent in furnishing
a cell phone to the motorist because the Company knew or should
have known that the motorist would use the cell phone while
driving.78 The court found that there was no relationship between
Cingular and Williams that would give rise to a duty of care.79 In
denying liability, the court held that it was not foreseeable that the
sale of a phone would result in an accident; “[r]ather, it is the
driver’s inattention while using the phone that may cause an
accident.”80
Durkee v. Geologic Solutions, Inc. is the only case decided to date
that deals with manufacturer liability for distracted driving
specifically because of text messaging.81 In Durkee, a North Carolina
case, a truck driver drove into vehicles that were stopped in front of
him on the highway, causing injuries and a death, while he was
using an in-truck text messaging system.82 Appellants sued the
company that manufactured the texting system located in his truck,
and alleged that the company owed them a duty of care because
“injuries to the traveling public were reasonably foreseeable based
on the texting system’s design and (1) required the driver to divert
77. Id. at 475.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 477.
80. Id. at 478.
81. 502 Fed. Appx. 326 (4th Cir. 2013), aff ’g Durkee v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 2d 742 (W.D.N.C. 2011).
82. Id. at 327.
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his eyes from the road to view an incoming text from the dispatcher,
and (2) permitted the receipt of texts while the vehicle was
moving.”83 The court affirmed the motion to dismiss. The court held
that “the accident was caused by the driver’s inattention, not the
texting device itself, and that the manufacturers are not required to
design a product incapable of distracting a driver.”84
The reasoning cited by the courts in Williams and Durkee can
easily and logically be extended to Kubert: it was the driver’s
inattention that caused the accident, not the cell phone or the text
message. If a driver’s inattention was the cause of an accident, and
not the product of the accident, as in Williams and Durkee, then it
should follow that the receipt of a text message was also not the
cause. The driver’s inattention trumps the other factors in these
situations. Of course, these cases are also distinguishable from
Kubert. The cases involved product manufacturers, and there is
more of an individual relationship between the remote third-party
texter and the driver than between the manufacturer and the
driver. Nonetheless, that does not change causation of accident:
driver inattention. 
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF PROVING THE DUTY IN KUBERT
The effective application of the duty of care articulated in Kubert
creates negative practical consequences. First, this duty is difficult
to prove. The court in Kubert stated that “[w]hen the sender ‘has
actual knowledge or special reason to know,’ from prior texting
experience or otherwise, that the recipient will view the text while
driving, the sender has breached a duty of care to the public by
distracting the driver.”85 This duty creates two potential scenarios
in which it may be applied: (1) actual knowledge by the sender that
the recipient will view the message while driving and (2) special
reason to know that the recipient will view the message while
driving.86
83. Id.
84. Id. at 327-28.
85. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
86. See id.
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A. Sender “Knows” that Recipient Will View the Message While
Driving
The first scenario, “when the sender knows that the text will
reach the driver while operating a vehicle,”87 seems very difficult to
prove with certainty. Knowledge, as the term is used here, means
a conscious “belief in a truth,” and requires actual “awareness of a
fact or condition.”88 
Whether the message will “reach the driver” depends on success-
ful transmission and delivery of the message. Text messaging
service is not 100 percent reliable.89 In fact, “baseline reliability of
SMS service is no better (and in some cases worse) than that of
other communication media such as email, traditional telephone
and VoIP.”90 One survey indicates that “82 percent of respondents
... who had sent an SMS or MMS91 message in the past year said
that [at least one of] their message[s] did not reach an intended
recipient.”92 Given that there is often no way to definitely know
whether a text message was successfully transmitted to the
recipient, it therefore seems very difficult to prove that the sender
knew that the recipient of the message would read it.
In the first scenario, the court also requires that the sender know
that the recipient will read the message while he is driving. It is
difficult to predict with absolute certainty what a person will be
doing at some point in the future. Although the sender might
anticipate that the recipient will be driving when he receives the
87. Id.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 cmt. c (1958).
89. See Xiaoqiao Meng et al., Analysis of the Reliability of a Nationwide Short Message
Service, INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENG’G CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMC’NS 1811
(2007), available at http://perma.cc/XSU2-5GAN (analyzing SMS message data records and
finding that during normal conditions 5.1 percent of SMS messages fail to reach their
intended destination).
90. Id.
91. SMS (short message service) and MMS (multimedia message services) are both types
of text messages. MMS messages can contain more characters and forms of media other than
text. For a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences between the types of
messages, see Richard Ling et al., Nascent Communication Genres within SMS and MMS, in
THE INSIDE TEXT: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND DESIGN PERSPECTIVES ON SMS 75, 76 (Richard
Harper et al. eds., 2005). 
92. Maisie Ramsay, Is SMS Reliability a Problem?, WIRELESS WEEK (Apr. 2, 2010, 9:25
AM), http://www.wirelessweek.com/articles/2010/04/sms-reliability-problem [http://perma.cc/
QR9L-HX5C].
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message, the inherent unpredictability of the future makes absolute
certainty difficult. For example, the driver might make an unex-
pected stop for a variety of reasons—a health emergency, a vehicle
emergency, such as a lack of gasoline or a flat tire, or simply the
desire to stop and get a cold drink—and therefore, might not read
the message while driving. In fact, one could say that nothing short
of watching the driver receive and read the message as he drives
would ensure with certainty that the message will reach the driver
while he is driving.
B. Sender “Has Special Reason” to Know that the Recipient Will
Read the Message While Driving
The second scenario the court lays involves a remote third-party
texter who has “[s]pecial reason to know[ ] from prior texting
experience or otherwise” that the recipient will read the message
while driving.93 Prior experience could be shown, for example, by
demonstrating that the sender of the text messages frequently
observed the recipient read text messages while driving. This is still
a high standard. Past conduct is not necessarily indicative of future
behavior, and a pattern of behavior would be difficult to prove with
certainty. For example, although the sender might recall that the
driver frequently looks at his phone while driving, that fact does not
appear to satisfy this standard. A plaintiff would need prove that
the sender knew that the driver was using his phone to read and
respond to text messages, as opposed to using it for other activities.
Furthermore, the sender would need direct knowledge of the
recipient’s behavior, and without other face-to-face interactions,
texting would not provide this knowledge. 
C. Special Relationship Between the Parties
Lastly, the court in Kubert considered the relationship between
the sender of the text message and the recipient as a factor in
imposing the duty.94 The court referred to Champion ex rel Ezzo v.
Dunfee, which evaluated a third party’s potential duty to control the
93. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
94. Id. at 1224.
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behavior of the driver. The Dunfee court considered whether “[a]
special relationship exists where the occupant has some control over
the driver, as where the driver is in the occupant’s employ or where
they are engaged in a joint enterprise or venture.”95 Examples of
such relationships that give the passenger control over the driver’s
conduct include parent-child, master-servant, landlord-tenant, and
guardian-ward.96 In Kubert, the court found that the friendship
between Best, the driver, and Colonna, the remote third-party send-
er of the text message, was not, by itself, sufficient to establish a
duty of care.97 
Given the strict requirements for establishing liability of a remote
third-party texter, it is clear that proving that the sender violated
this duty would be difficult. There are few situations where one
seeking to prove liability would be able to definitively show the
sender actually knew the recipient was driving at the time. Proving
that the sender had special reason to know that the recipient would
read the message while driving also would be difficult.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures
Although imposing civil liability on a remote third-party texter
may seem extreme, some would argue that it is a necessary measure
to combat a serious problem in our nation—distracted driving.
Distracted driving, which includes texting and using a navigation
system, among other things, was the cause of approximately one in
six fatal vehicle collisions in 2008.98 As discussed above, distracted
driving presents a serious problem to the safety of the traveling
public in our nation.99
95. Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 830 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
96. Id.
97. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1224.
98. Wilson & Stimpson, supra note 27, at 2213.
99. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
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1. Comparison to Drunk Driving Epidemic
Although texting while driving and other forms of distracted
driving are currently the prevailing driver safety issue on the roads,
it is not the first such significant issue.100 Drunk driving was
considered a national epidemic, and was the subject of a flurry of
legislation in the early 1980s.101
Scholars have likened the current texting while driving “epi-
demic” to the former drunk driving epidemic in the 1980s.102 Just as
with texting while driving today, the public recognized the danger
of drunk driving. They “[c]lamored for legislative responses to
strengthen drunk driving laws” after the number of serious or fatal
car crashes caused by drunk driving peaked in 1982.103 Legislation
strengthened the penalties for drunk driving, imposing harsher
fines and sentences.104 
Drunk driving became a national priority in the 1980s in large
part due to social activism.105 Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD) was formed in 1980 by the mother of a teenager who was
killed by a repeat offender drunk driver (other local groups were
formed as well).106 These groups and their grassroots campaign
against drunk driving brought the issue into the spotlight, resulting
in media attention, public awareness, and increased focus from the
government.107 In 1982, President Reagan appointed a Presidential
Commission on Drunk Driving, which created a plan of action for
addressing the drunk driving problem.108 Citizen groups such as
MADD focused on deterring drinking and driving, in part by
attaching a new negative stigma to it through media campaigns.109
100. De Soto, supra note 9, at 390.
101. See id. at 362-63.
102. See id. (discussing the legislative response to texting while driving and proposing
different, and possibly more effective, solutions).
103. Id. at 363.
104. Id. at 364.
105. Allan F. Williams, Alcohol-Impaired Driving and Its Consequences in the United
States: The Past 25 Years, 37 J. SAFETY RES. 123, 124 (2006). 
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 128.
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In addition to raising awareness, citizen groups, such as MADD,
also lobbied for new legislation addressing drunk driving.110 The
federal government and individual states passed legislation, and the
new laws took many different approaches to addressing the
problem.111 New policies included laws increasing penalties for
drunk driving, lowering the legal BAC limit, and raising the
minimum drinking age.112 From 1981 to 1986, 729 state legislators
passed laws related to drunk driving.113
Social host liability, as previously discussed, was a measure
enacted by states in response to the drunk driving problem.114 At the
time of its inception, legislators and scholars thought that social
host liability was a hasty and ill-thought-out form of liability.115 The
thought was that “[r]hetoric about the evils of driving while
intoxicated, without more, does not justify a departure from the
common law rule that only the drunk driver, and not the host who
served him, is liable for injuries stemming from alcohol-related
accidents.”116 Concerns cited by the critics of these reforms included
moral blameworthiness, unfairness, and lack of a remedy for the
plaintiffs.117 These concerns mirror those articulated by opponents
to civil liability for remote third-party texters.118 For example, New
Jersey Assemblywoman Celeste Riley raised concerns about the
110. Id. 
111. William N. Evans et al., General Deterrence of Drunk Driving: Evaluation of Recent
American Policies, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 279, 280 (1991).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra Part II.B.2.
115. See Derry D. Sparlin, Jr., Note, Social Host Liability for Guests Who Drink and Drive:
A Closer Look at the Benefits and Burdens, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV 583, 631 (1986) (critiquing
the institution of social host liability).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 623-26.
118. See, e.g., James Beattie, “Don’t Blame the Texter” Bill Submitted in NJ General
Assembly, CNSNEWS (Sept. 25, 2013, 9:19 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/james-beattie/
don-t-blame-texter-bill-submitted-nj-general-assembly [http://perma.cc/VL4-ZAYT] (discussing
New Jersey Assemblywoman Caroline Casagrande’s bill, which proposes to statutorily
eliminate potential liability of remote third-party texters); Ben Brumfield & Chris Boyette,
Text a Driver in New Jersey, and You Could See Your Day in Court, CNN (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:40
PM) http: //www.cnn.com / 2013 / 08 / 29 / us / new - jersey - texting - crash - sender - liable
[http://perma.cc/7FYX-PGVU] (discussing how responsibility for texting and driving should
belong to the driver, and quoting a radio interview with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie,
“You have the obligation to keep your eyes on the road, your hands on the wheel and pay
attention to what you’re doing”).
2015] CIVIL LIABILITY OF REMOTE THIRD-PARTY TEXTERS 1023
moral blameworthiness element at play in the new duty created in
Kubert. “At some point we have to be responsible and accountable
for our own behavior. We cannot blame it on who’s texting you....
This is about taking personal responsibility for your behavior, being
personally accountable for your behavior, for your distracted driv-
ing; Turn the phone off !”119
Although social host liability was controversial at its inception120
it has become an accepted part of our law and culture like remote
third-party duty of care is proving to be today. Supporters of the
remote third-party texter duty of care point to the fact that most
states now have some form of social host liability; if not for all
persons, it at least exists for minors.121 For example, New York’s
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law states that “[n]o person shall sell,
deliver or give away or cause or permit or procure to be sold, deliver-
ed or given away any alcoholic beverages to (1) any person ... under
the age of twenty one years [or] (2) any visibly intoxicated per-
son.”122 Today, social hosts can face both criminal and civil penalties
for their actions.123 
However, critics of the third-party texter duty would argue that
many of the strict measures implemented to combat drunk driving
were not effective. First, many states have backed away from
imposing such harsh social host liability, such as the liability
established in Kelly v. Gwinnell.124 In fact, most states restrict social
host liability to minors.125 In other words, parties are liable only for
the injuries of their intoxicated social guests if the guests are
minors.126 
119. Beattie, supra note 118. 
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
121. State Law, SOCIALHOSTLIABILTY.ORG, http://socialhostliability.org/law/ [http://perma.
cc/WA8X-G6T9] (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). For a state-by-state summary of social host
liability laws, see Dram Shop and Social Host Liability, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING,
http://www.madd.org/laws/law-overview/Dram_Shop_Overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/675C-
W8D8] (last updated June 2012).
122. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 2010).
123. See generally Jared Wachtler, Are New York’s Social Host Liability Laws Too Strict,
Too Lenient, or Just Right?, 27 TOURO L. REV. 309 (2011) (discussing New York’s criminal and
civil sanctions for social hosts in the context of history and in comparison to the laws in the
nation).
124. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
125. See Dram Shop and Social Host Liability, supra note 121, at 2-3.
126. Id.
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In an effort to decrease drunk driving, many states increased
fines and jail time for the crime, especially for repeat offenders.127
The effectiveness of both of these measures has been subsequently
critiqued.128 A scholarly review of thirty-nine studies about the
effects of increased fines and jail sentences on drunk driving rates
did not find any consistent decreases in drunk driving as a result of
these measures.129 It found that mandatory fines and jail penalties
did “not have clearly demonstrable general deterrent or preventa-
tive effects.”130 
During the period when public concern about drinking and
driving was at its peak, states rushed to pass broad and comprehen-
sive social host liability laws, as well as laws increasing the
penalties for drunk driving.131 History has shown that such across-
the-board measures were largely ineffective.132 Therefore, courts
should carefully analyze the potential effects of imposing new duties
and laws for texting while driving, so as not to overreach, as the
courts did in response to the drunk driving epidemic.
B. Part of Larger Effort to Deter Texting While Driving
Supporters of the duty articulated in Kubert would argue that,
more than practical implications, the duty might have an important
deterrence effect. Civil liability for remote texters is just one piece
in the puzzle of deterring texting while driving. Undoubtedly, it is
necessary to address the problem from multiple angles. One could
argue that the court in Kubert wanted to send a message to texters
and was less focused on creating a practical duty. It is possible that
the court realized how difficult its new duty would be to prove,133
127. See Alexander C. Wagenaar et al., General Deterrence Effects of U.S. Statutory DUI
Fine & Jail Penalties: Long Term Follow-up in 32 States, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 982 (2007) (observing that between 1976 and 2002, twenty-six states statutorily
imposed mandatory minimum fines for DUI and eighteen implemented mandatory jail penal-
ties for first time offenders).
128. See id.
129. Id. at 992.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Part III.
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and perhaps intended this. As a deterrence measure, however, the
duty of care articulated by the court in Kubert is overbroad.
The threat of civil liability for remote third-party texters could
have the desired result and scare the public into stopping their
texting and driving behaviors. However, the decision might scare
the public into not texting at all. This is because the duty articu-
lated in Kubert focuses on the sender of the text, not the recipient
driver. And, it is recipient driver who has the primary responsibility
to follow the law and avoid distractions while driving, not the
sender of the message. Focusing on the sender of the text message,
who most likely does not know if the recipient of his message is
driving, could deter text messaging in an overly broad way that is
not beneficial to the public.
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[c]ell phone and
text message communications are so pervasive that some persons
may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments
for self-expression, even self-identification.”134 Furthermore, text
messaging, if not done while driving, has many benefits. Texting is
a quick, easy, and discrete way to communicate with others. Text
messaging can also provide helpful information to the public,
ranging from notifications of electricity outages135 to information
about prenatal health sent to expecting mothers.136 The deterrence
effect of Kubert’s duty is overbroad and discourages all texting, not
just texting while driving, which is the problem the court in Kubert
was trying to address.
If the court’s ultimate goal was simply to raise awareness about
the dangers of texting while driving, however, it was very likely
successful. Indeed, the court’s decision in Kubert gained national
attention from both popular news outlets and legal news sources.137
134. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010). 
135. See ENTERGY, https://www.entergytext.com/ [http://perma.cc/Z97D-22HA] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015) (offering text alerts about power outages to customers).
136. See New Study Finds Text Messaging Program Benefits Pregnant Women, GEO. WASH.
PUB. HEALTH (June 9, 2014), http://publichealth.gwu.edu/content/new-study-finds-text-
messaging-program-benefits-pregnant-women [http://perma.cc/529V-QQK7].
137. See, e.g., Brumfield & Boyette, supra note 118; Martha Neil, Remote Texter Can Be
Held Liable for Distracted Driver’s Crash, Appeals Court Rules, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 27, 2013,
6:02 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/remote_texter_can_be_held_liable_for_
distracted_drivers_crash [http://perma.cc/DQ37-7WGM]; Peggy Wright, Text Sender Could
Be Civilly Liable for N.J. Wreck, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2013 1:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2013/08/29/texting-driving-crash-ruling-nj/2727549/ [http://perma.cc/
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Although not a decision from New Jersey’s highest court, Kubert v.
Best elicited comments from the Governor of New Jersey138 and
spawned additional legislation throughout the state.139 It is possible
that the court in Kubert was taking a different strategy to address
the texting and driving problem in light of recent studies which
reveal that banning handheld cell phone use while driving might
not actually reduce crash rates.140
As a scare tactic, the court’s decision in Kubert to create a new
duty might represent a policy-driven decision. However, as dis-
cussed above, the deterrence effect of the court’s decision is over-
broad. Furthermore, publicity and this method of deterrence alone
are not nearly enough to solve the problems caused by texting and
driving in the United States. A coordinated response from federal
and state governments, cell phone manufacturers and service
carriers, and the public at large is necessary to curb texting and
driving in the United States.141 Perhaps the federal government
should coordinate the collaboration between various federal
agencies, the states, cell phone companies, and consumers.142
Regardless, the new duty of care articulated in Kubert represents,
at best, an overbroad scare tactic intended to frighten drivers into
ceasing to text while driving, and, at worst, a practically unenforce-
able and unwarranted expansion of third party liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The duty articulated in Kubert represents a departure from the
current legal understanding of a duty to the public because the
ET5K-LT9V] (summarizing the facts and decision in Kubert v. Best).
138. See Brumfield & Boyette, supra note 118. 
139. See Beattie, supra note 118.
140. See Highway Loss Data Institute, Hand-Held Cellphone Laws & Collision Claim
Frequencies, 26 HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST. BULLETIN 17 (2009) (finding that, based on
insurance collision loss data, handheld cell phone use by drivers and bans on such use has not
affected trends in collision claims); Study: Cell Phone Bans Don’t Reduce Accidents, CNN  (Jan.
29, 2010, 5:57 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/01/29/cellphone.study/ [http://perma.cc/79JS-
9M75] (discussing the Highway Loss Data Institute Study and its implications).
141. See Alexa M. Farris, Note, LOL? Texting and Driving Is No Laughing Matter:
Proposing a Coordinated Response to Curb This Dangerous Activity, 36 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
233, 251 (2011) (discussing the various players in issue and how they could work together to
alleviate the problem of texting and driving).
142. Id. at 251-59.
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texter is in a remote location, his action is legal and not necessarily
intended to spark tortious activity on the part of the driver, and the
driver’s tortious activity is a completely voluntary undertaking that
is not automatic or unavoidable given the circumstances.143 Al-
though these factors individually might not represent a departure
from our current understanding of a duty to the public, when taken
together, they go beyond any duties to the public that have been
articulated previously. 
Because of the level of attenuation and the disconnect between
the activity of sending a message and the negligent driving of an-
other person, other states should not follow New Jersey’s lead in
allowing civil liability for remote third party texters. Although only
New Jersey has addressed the issue, if other states followed New
Jersey’s lead, this new duty could become the norm. 
This has important ramifications for drivers and texters every-
where. Mainly, this new duty would create uncertainty for texters.
Millions of people send text messages every day, and it is safe to
assume that many of them are not aware of whether the recipient
of the message is driving at that exact time. Although sending a text
message while not driving is usually perfectly legal and harmless,
this new duty could impose civil liability on certain senders, even
ones who do not know for a fact that the recipient is driving. Other
states seeking to deter texting while driving should adopt different,
more certain measures for deterrence. 
Perhaps, however, the motivation behind the court’s decision in
Kubert was not to create a duty that would be implemented
frequently, but rather to deter texting while driving. If that is the
case, it makes sense that the duty is practically impossible to prove
with certainty.144 However, choosing to impose civil liability on
remote third-party texters was an overbroad means to that end.
Although news of the court’s decision in Kubert might deter drivers
from texting and driving, it might cause some texters to cease text
messaging altogether, which is not necessarily in the public’s best
interest.
Despite potentially honorable intentions, it is undeniable that the
court in Kubert created an entirely new duty of care, one that goes
143. See discussion supra Part II.A.
144. See discussion supra Part III.
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beyond the duties which third parties currently owe to the public on
behalf of others. This new duty of care creates uncertainty for text-
ers and goes too far. Other states should not follow New Jersey’s
lead in this regard.
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